Abstract. Modes of operation adapt block ciphers to many applications. Among the encryption modes, only CFB (Cipher Feedback) has both of the following properties: Firstly it allows transmission units shorter than the block-cipher length to be encrypted and sent without delay and message expansion. Secondly, it can resynchronize after the loss of such transmission units. However, CFB is ine cient in such applications, since for every transmission unit, regardless how short, a call to the block cipher is needed. We propose a new mode of operation based on CFB which remedies this problem. Our proposal, OCFB, is almost optimally e cient (i.e., almost as many message bits are encrypted as block-cipher output bits produced) and it can self-synchronize after the loss or insertion of transmission units. We prove the security of CFB and OCFB in the sense of modern cryptography.
Introduction
Symmetric-key block ciphers are one of the most prominent building blocks in many cryptographic systems. They are used to construct various primitives such as stream ciphers, message authentication codes, and hash functions. Conceptually, a block cipher is a function that maps xed-size l-bit plaintext blocks to l-bit ciphertext blocks (l is called the length of block cipher). The function is parametrized by a key k of a certain length. Examples of well-known block ciphers are Triple-DES (based on DES77]), IDEA LM91] and the AES candidates NIST00], in particular Rijndael DR99] . To encrypt longer messages and to ful l varying application requirements, several modes of operation for block ciphers have been proposed. Among the standardized encryption modes from FIPS81], CBC (Cipher Block Chaining) and CFB (Cipher Feedback) use the previous ciphertext block in the encryption so that each ciphertext block depends on the preceding plaintext, while OFB (Output Feedback) acts as pseudorandom bit generator and allows a large part of the encryption procedure to be precomputed. CFB and OFB can be used for applications where plaintext units with L < l bits (L = 8 and L = 1 are typical cases) must be encrypted and ? Sirrix AG, D-66424 Homburg, Germany. Email: alkassar@sirrix.com ?? Universit at des Saarlandes, FR 6.2 Informatik, D-66123 Saarbr ucken, Germany.
Email: ageraldy@krypt.cs.uni-sb.de, fp tzmann, sadeghig@cs.uni-sb.de transmitted without delay. We call this a transmission unit. The counter mode (e.g., DH79,LRW00]) can replace OFB.
Several applications need a self-synchronizing mode of operation, i.e., an error in the ciphertext must only lead to a small amount of incorrect plaintext. These are applications where the protocols have no or very basic built-in fault tolerance because the data type, e.g., voice or video, is such that small errors are unnoticeable or recoverable by natural redundancy. A more systematic alternative to a self-synchronizing cipher would be to add more error correction either to the transmission system or the application, but in practice, both may be xed and one has to o er a transparent encryption layer in between. An application where we encountered this problem is ISDN, a common network for the subscriber area in Europe and Japan Boc92], in particular for integrating phone, fax and Internet access. An e ective way to secure the voice and fax communication, too, is transparent encryption directly before the ISDN network termination, e.g., by an ISDN card together with software encryption. Here one has precisely the network and application conditions for a self-synchronizing cipher: no underlying error correction, no message expansion possible (at least not without administrational problems), and the applications tolerate small errors but not desynchronization.
There are di erent types of errors. We speak of bit errors if certain bits are ipped, but the number of bits is unchanged. (Hence we include some burst errors in this class.) Slips are errors where bits are lost or inserted. Apart from outside disturbances, slips result from crossing networks with di erent clock frequency. CBC and CFB only tolerate slips if entire transmission units are inserted or lost. Hence only CFB can be used on networks where slips for units smaller than the block-cipher length occur. For instance, ISDN is byte-synchronous, i.e., slips can only be multiples of L = 8 bits Boc92]. Hence CFB with 8-bit transmission units can be used. If nothing at all is known about the slips, L = 1 must be used. However, CFB is ine cient in such cases, since for every transmission unit the block cipher is called to encrypt l bits, e.g., 64 or 128. This is n = l=L times as often as in other modes.
In this paper we present a solution OCFB to this problem. It is based on CFB, almost as e cient as CFB with L = l and self-synchronizing even for L < l. We prove the concrete security of CFB and OCFB in the sense of BDJR97]. To our knowledge this is also the rst rigorous security analysis of CFB. These properties make our proposal very appealing also to all applications which already use CFB.
Related literature: CFB and OCFB are so-called single modes of operation. Recently, multiple modes of operation have found considerable attention, but results as in Bih94, Bih98, Wag98, HP99] suggest that single modes with a better block cipher are more promising. Now that an AES winner has been announced, this seems realistic.
Apart from that, recent research on modes of operation concentrates on MAC modes, e.g., BR00,PR00,CKM00] and modes combining integrity and secrecy GD00,Jut00,Rog00]. This is clearly important for many applications and the natural way to build new applications, but as motivated above, wellestablished networks and applications remain where self-synchronization is important.
Proving the security of modes of operation started with BKR94,BGR95], and a large part of the new literature cited above contains such proofs. Encryption modes (CBC and counter) were rst treated in BDJR97], and here also the concrete security of symmetric encryption was de ned in detail.
The only fairly recent security analysis for CFB we know is PNRB94], but rather from the point of view that CFB does not prevent di erential and linear cryptanalysis of the block cipher.
Outline of the paper: We rst present some basics and notations: the transmission model, notation for encryption, and CFB and its self-synchronization properties. After this we present our proposed operation mode OCFB and its self-synchronization property and compare the e ciency of CFB and OCFB. Finally, we present left-or-right security BDJR97] as a basis for our security treatment and give concrete security proofs for both standard CFB and OCFB.
Preliminaries

Transmission Model
As motivated above, we assume a communication system with L-bit transmission units. The most important fact is that slips, i.e., losses or insertions, only occur for entire transmission units. The main case we consider is L = 8. We assume that we are not allowed any message expansion.
Encryption Notation
A block cipher is a triple (gen; enc; dec). The algorithm gen randomly generates a key k, which is used by the encryption function enc k : f0; 1g l ! f0; Other notations are jmj for the length of a string and for the bitwise exor of strings of equal length. By a 2 R S we denote the random and uniform selection of an element a from the set S. Further, P(pred(x) :: x = A(z)) represents the probability that x ful ls a certain predicate pred if x is chosen with the probabilistic algorithm A on input z. 1 CFB and OCFB do not use dec k or the fact that enc k is a permutation; hence we could also de ne them with an arbitrary family F of functions enc k .
Cipher Feedback Mode
The Cipher Feedback Mode (CFB) is illustrated in Figure Error Propagation: Under the given error model, i.e., if slips only occur for multiples of transmission units, errors disturb decryption only as long as they remain in the shift register of the receiver.
Optimized Cipher Feedback (OCFB)
For communication systems with L l, CFB is ine cient. For instance, for L = 8, it calls enc k for every single transmitted byte. This is less e cient than other modes by a factor of n = l=L, e.g., 8 for DES and 16 for AES. The e ciency of CFB can be optimized by bu ering all l output bits of enc k and using them for successive transmission units, using a counter to trigger a call of enc k every n-th transmission unit. However, this would destroy the selfsynchronization for slips of individual transmission units because the counters of the sender and the recipient would lose their synchrony (relative to the ciphertext stream). Hence the counters must be resynchronized. As the transmission model does not allow message expansion, this can only be done via the ciphertext itself. The idea is to use a synchronization pattern; this is sketched in Figure 2 . Each automaton (for encryption and decryption) compares the content of its shift register SR1 with this pattern after each transmission unit. If it nds the pattern, it resets its counter; this reset synchronizes the counters of the two automata.
mi + ci CFB can be seen as a special case of OCFB where the synchronization pattern is found in every round (e.g., by using the pattern length zero).
E ciency of CFB and OCFB
We de ne the e ciency e M of a mode of operation M as the average number of encrypted plaintext bits per call to the l-bit block cipher, divided by l. The optimum with any normal mode of operation is therefore 1. The e ciency of CFB l;L is e CFB l;L = L=l. The e ciency of OCFB is E(X)=n, where X, called distance, is the random variable describing the number of transmission units between two calls to the block cipher, and E(X) its expectation. Recall that the pattern matches random data with probability p. Let If shiftcount = n, the block cipher is always called. Hence, assuming that the values c i are random (this will be justi ed in Section 5), the distance X has a cut-o geometric distribution: P(X = j) = p j?1 p for 0 < j < n and P(X = n) = p n?1 . Hence E(X) = This can be veri ed by multiplying the terms out; a similar formula can, e.g., be found in Nel95]. Hence the e ciency is e OCFB l;L;p = (1 ? p n )=(np).
For instance, for l = 64 and L = 8, an 8-bit pattern with p = 2 ?8 gives an e ciency of 0:986, i.e., one block-cipher call for 7:89 bytes on average. Self-synchronization for bit errors is as in CFB. Self-synchronization after a slip takes somewhat longer, 1=p transmission units on average. Tests have shown that this is no problem for phone and fax with the parameters from the previous example and the usual error rates of ISDN. Even with much larger p, e.g., p = 1=n so that resynchronization after slips happens after about one l-bit block just as for bit errors, the e ciency of OCFB is still far superior to that of CFB. E.g., for l = 64 and L = 8, we then get e OCFB l;L;p = 1?(1?1=n) n 0:66, which is more than 5 times faster than CFB. 3 For our main example L = 8, this is reasonable and simpli es the analysis because successive matchings are independent. For small L (in particular, L = 1) we advise a pattern like 100:::000 where repetition is only possible after Lp=L transmission units. 4 Depending on the soft-or hardware con guration, it may be useful to bu er the values oi to avoid problems if the pattern sometimes repeats faster than its expectation. In the de nition, Step 4 becomes ci = mi o i? for a bu er length . The computation of the oi's and the exors are then almost asynchronous. The security analysis is easily adapted to this case.
Security
In this section we prove the concrete security of CFB and OCFB, using the rst proof as a basis for the second one. The proof follows the pattern of other security proofs of modes of operation: The block cipher is modeled as a pseudo-random function GGM86] or rather, for concrete security, one parametrizes the e ort an adversary needs to notice non-random properties BKR94]. One then shows that any attack against the mode of operation that succeeds with a certain probability given a certain amount of resources would give an attack on the underlying block cipher, again with precise resources and probability.
Left-or-Right Security
Left-or-right security was introduced in BDJR97] as a strong (adaptive) form of chosen-plaintext security. 5 The attack is modeled as a game between an ac- The rst term describes the probability that D lr outputs e = 0 when interacting with the oracle containing b = 0, and the second term the corresponding probability for an oracle with b = 1. The de nition is illustrated for CFB in Chosen-ciphertext security is not required in BDJR97], and it cannot be required in the strict sense for a self-synchronizing cipher: This would correspond to non-malleability, but the purpose of self-synchronization is precisely to make slightly distorted ciphertexts decrypt to related cleartexts. 
Function Families
When considering a mode of operation, the block cipher is typically modeled as a pseudo-random function. In the case of CFB a weaker assumption is su cient:
Only the family of functions f k = select(enc k ( )) must be pseudo-random (see Figure 1) .
We use the concrete-security de nitions from BKR94,BDJR97]. An (l; )-function family is a multiset F of functions f k : f0; 1g l ! f0; 1g . Alternatively, one writes f 2 R F for the random choice of a function from the family, or k gen if an algorithm is given that generates a key such that f k is random in F.
The (l; )-random function family R l; consists of all functions rf : f0; 1g l ! f0; 1g . A key is simply an entire function rf . Clearly, such a key is much too long in practice, but pseudo-randomness of other (l; )-function families F is de ned relative to R l; : An adversary D prf interacts with an oracle F that has chosen a function f randomly from either F or R l; . In each round, D prf may send a value x 2 f0; 1g l and F answers with f(x). Again, the adversary has to output a bit meant as a guess at the function family, and its advantage is de ned as for a statistical test. By CFB l;L (F ) we denote CFB used with a certain function family F in the place of the functions f k = select(enc k ( )). Similarly, OCFB l;L;p (F ) denotes OCFB with F as the functions enc k .
De nition 2 (Pseudo-random functions BDJR97]). An (l; )-function
Security with Random Functions
Before proving a certain degree of concrete security, it is useful to consider what one can reasonably expect. This is a birthday bound, similar to other modes with feedback. The basic idea is that left-or-right security breaks down at the rst repetition of the value of SR1: The adversary D lr knows the values in SR1 (they are ciphertexts, at least after the initialization vector). If We now show that if CFB were used with real random functions, there would indeed be no better attack than waiting for collisions among values of SR1, and we derive the resulting concrete security.
Lemma 1 (Concrete security of CFB with random functions). 
For the same reason, collisions are the only help for the adversary. If no collision occurs, the adversary outputs e = 0 with the same probability for b = 0 and b = 1.
P 0 e = 0 j C] = P 1 e = 0 j C]:
We can therefore rewrite the adversary's advantage as follows (using (1) and (2) in the last equality):
Adv D lr = P 0 e = 0] ? P 1 e = 0] = P 0 e = 0 j C] P 0 C] + P 0 e = 0 j C] P 0 C] ? P 1 e = 0 j C] P 1 C] ? P 1 e = 0 j C] P 1 C] = P C](P 0 e = 0 j C] ? P 1 e = 0 j C]) P C]:
Collisions: For the collision probability, we cannot simply use the birthday formula because SR1 i and SR1 j are not independent if jj ? ij < n. We then say that SR1 i and SR1 j overlap.
We de ne the stream B = IV c 1 : : : c q?1 of all the collision-relevant transmission units, i.e., those shifted through SR1 until the last, q-th, encryption.
The length of B is Q = (n + q ? 1)L bits, and the shift register contents are SR1 i = B i] : : : B i + n ? 1] for i = 1; : : : ; q. We rst derive the number col i;j of streams with a collision SR1 i = SR1 j for every possible pair (i; j), i.e., 1 i < j q. We do this for the case with random initialization vector IV .
(The di erence in the other case is negligible). a) Without overlapping, i.e., j i + n: which remained to be shown.
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Lemma 2 (Concrete security of OCFB with random function).
For all parameters, OCFB with random functions is at least as secure as CFB for the same length of the block cipher and transmission units, i.e., OCFB l;L;p (R l;l ) is at least as secure as CFB l;L (R l;L ).
Proof. The structure of the proof is similar to that for CFB. 
Security with Pseudo-Random Functions
Now we want to prove the security of CFB and OCFB with pseudo-random functions, i.e., in the real world, as far as the block cipher is pseudo-random.
Theorem 1 (Concrete security of CFB with pseudo-random functions).
Let F be a (t 0 ; q 0 ; " 0 )-secure (l; L)-bit pseudo-random function family, and t CFB the time needed for one CFB round without the computation of f k . Then CFB l;L (F ) is (t; q; ; ")-secure in the left-or-right sense with q = q 0 , = q 0 L, t = t 0 ? qt CFB ? t const for a small constant t const , and " = 2" 0 + " CFB l;L ;q .
These bounds are very good: The allowed time t for an attack is almost t 0 (because t 0 is the time for an attack on F, while qt CFB is time needed for the correct use of CFB), and an addition of 2" 0 is standard for this kind of proof (see BDJR97]).
The basic idea of the proof is the standard pseudo-randomness argument: If an adversary could break left-or-right security of CFB with a pseudo-random function family better than this is possible with random functions, one could use this adversary as a distinguisher between real and pseudo-random functions. The following reduction gives the concrete security for this argument. Proof. We assume that a distinguisher D lr contradicts the theorem. We construct a distinguisher D prf which contains D lr as a black box, playing the left-or-right game with a CFB oracle, see Theorem 2 (Concrete security of OCFB with pseudo-random functions).
OCFB is as secure as CFB in the following sense: Let F be a (t 0 ; q 0 ; " 0 )-secure (l; l)-bit pseudo-random function family. Then OCFB l;L;p (F ) is (t; q; ; ")-secure in the left-or-right sense with q = q 0 , = qL, t = t 0 ? qt OCFB ? t const , and " = 2" 0 + " CFB l;L ;q . Proof. This proof is almost identical to that for CFB. The only di erence is that D lr simulates an OCFB-oracle instead of a CFB-oracle, and therefore the time for each call is t OCFB instead of t CFB .
2 In fact, the security is better: On average, D lr only needs q 0 = q=(n e OCFB l;L;p ) calls to its own oracle F (corresponding to the block cipher) to encrypt the q transmission units, i.e., q can be chosen correspondingly larger.
Furthermore, as discussed after Lemma 2, the bound " CFB l;L ;q in that lemma is not quite tight. The proof of Theorem 2 remains unchanged for whatever value " OCFB l;L;p ;q is proven in Lemma 1.
